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SOME PLURALISM ABOUT PLURALISM: A COMMENT 
ON HANOCH DAGAN’S “PLURALISM AND 
PERFECTIONISM IN PRIVATE LAW” 
Jedediah Purdy* 
Response to: Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 
Colum. L. Rev. 1409 (2012). 
 
Hanoch Dagan is among “those who think it advantageous to get as much 
ethics into the law as they can,” in the phrase of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1 
His pluralism is a perfectionism for polytheists: There are many human goods, 
and each has its domain, including some portion of the law of property.2 
Depending on where we stand on the property landscape at any time, we may 
be community-minded sharers, devoted romantics in marriage, or coolly 
rational market actors, and the local property law will smooth each of these 
paths for us. Property law is built on the design of the multifarious human 
heart, or, if you prefer, the many purposes we pursue in our projects and 
 
  * Professor, Duke University School of Law. 
  1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law and the Common Law 8 (Kaplan 
Publ’g 2009) (1897).  
2. On pluralism in values, see generally Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal (1988), 
reprinted in The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays 1, 1–16 (Henry Hardy & 
Roger Hausheer eds., 1997); John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism 34–68 (2000); Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity 495–521 (1989). Value pluralism has at 
least two lines of origin in modern thought. One line embodies the skepticism of figures as 
diverse as Michel de Montaigne and David Hume, who rejected the medieval Aristotelian view 
that all goods are reconcilable in one highest good, and instead posited a world in which human 
reason gave us no reason to believe in a unified and universally available account of moral 
reasoning. See generally David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and 
Concerning the Principles of Morals 169–75 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 3d ed. 1975) (1777); Michel 
de Montaigne, Apology for Raymond Sebond (1575–76, 1578–80), in The Complete Essays of 
Montaigne 318, 318–457 (Donald M. Frame trans., 1958) [hereinafter Montaigne, Essays]; 
Michel de Montaigne, Of Cannibals (1578–80), in Montaigne, Essays, supra, at 150, 150–59. The 
other line embodies the romantic strand of thought associated with Johann Gottfried von Herder. 
He proposed that each human culture creates a unique vocabulary and grammar of cultural 
expression and of value, which give sense and meaning to the lives of those who inhabit that 
culture and which cannot be judged against any higher or independent standard. See Johann 
Gottfried von Herder, How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit 
of the People (1765), reprinted in Philosophical Writings 3, 3–30 (Michael N. Forster ed. & 
trans., 2002). 
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relationships. Each of these implies a way of regarding others—as arm’s length 
collaborators, joint venturers, or other halves whose purposes we have joined 
to ours; property’s default rules anticipate and confirm these various attitudes.3 
Dagan, of course, would not accept Holmes’s ironic assertion that he has 
managed to “get as much ethics into the law” as he can. He would say that it 
was already there, and that he brought it out. Surely this is plausible. In his 
short Essay, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law,4 and his much more 
detailed study, Property, Dagan builds his argument from the structure of 
various areas of property law, which are more or less individualistic, more or 
less based on the model of exclusion, and more or less tilted toward sharing.5 
This should not be surprising. The scope of property law is enormous: It 
defines and allocates claims on scarce and valued resources, the many good 
things of the world that we need to live, act, and pursue our projects.6 Without 
some share of these, we would be naked, unsheltered, and virtually powerless. 
Everything we do, including simple survival, therefore involves us in the web 
of property claims, and all our relationships with others, from a spot 
transaction to a marriage, are housed within those claims. It is hardly 
imaginable that just one model of property rules could serve all kinds of 
projects and relationships. It seems almost inevitable that the law’s architecture 
would somewhat reflect the diverse ways that people live within it. Sometimes 
form follows function. 
To say that Dagan’s thesis is not surprising is not at all to deny that it is 
interesting, original, and admirable. On the contrary, it is all of these. Dagan’s 
close attention to property’s institutions turns his pluralism into a valuable 
interpretive map of the field. The ethics he draws out of the law really is there, 
but it is not explicit on the surface, and Dagan’s project requires the 
interpretive work of both a serious property scholar and an able normative 
theorist. Pluralism, in the register of Isaiah Berlin, can be vague and evocative, 
like riding a glass-bottomed boat over the colorful shoals of human values.7 
Dagan’s pluralism is evocative, but also specific—a taxonomy of what is and 
what we do with it. In fact, it is a mark of his success that his argument can 
seem unsurprising. He shows, in detail, the connection of property’s structures 
to who we are and what we do.8 
 
3. See Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions 229–44 (2011) (setting out in detail 
arguments paraphrased here) [hereinafter Dagan, Property]. 
4. See Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 
1409 (2012) [hereinafter Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism].  
5. See Dagan, Property, supra note 3, at 57–75 (reviewing property’s institutional and value 
pluralism); id. at 155–96 (describing institutional negotiation of communitarian and liberal 
values). 
6. See Jedediah Purdy, The Meaning of Property: Freedom, Community, and the Legal 
Imagination 9–12 (2010) [hereinafter Purdy, The Meaning of Property] (giving this definition); 
id. at 100–09 (setting out and exploring some of the ways property mediates interdependence). 
7. See Berlin, supra note 2, at 191–242 (reviewing political liberty and pluralism). 
8. See, e.g., Dagan, Property, supra note 3, at 197–228 (exploring property law of marriage 
in these terms). 
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So, can a pluralist be pluralist about pluralism? That is, when might a 
pluralist have good, pluralist reasons to act like a monist? In this piece, I 
suggest two quite distinct ways that a monist approach can usefully contribute 
to the work of a thoughtful pluralist like Dagan. I call this proposal, taken 
together, selective monism, the decision of a pluralist to think as a monist for 
certain purposes. One example is an interpretive instance of what Dagan calls 
structural monism—that is, it proceeds on the thesis that property law is 
organized according to a single principle.9 The other is an instance of reformist 
monism, the idea that property law should promote a single value, despite its 
actual, present pluralism.10 
I. THE INTERPRETIVE SELECTIVE MONIST 
For the interpretive example, I would like to imagine a property theorist 
who has much in common with Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, two of the 
“exclusion theorists” whom Dagan discusses.11 Our theorist is a pluralist about 
value: As Dagan notes of Merrill and Smith, she believes that property 
institutions draw on many kinds of moral intuitions and make possible many 
different kinds of activity, and that our endorsement of property institutions 
reflects these multiple reasons.12 Nonetheless, she wishes to make a selective 
commitment to the idea that property law is defined by granting certain 
individuals the power to exclude the rest of the world from certain things. She 
decides to act like an exclusion theorist. 
Why? Why surrender the sensitive attention to the spectrum of form and 
purpose that property law presents? Why, as Dagan puts it, “set aside the rather 
capacious aspects of [property law] where inclusion or governance looms 
large?”13 My selective monist replies as follows: 
I believe there is no understanding property law without appreciating 
that it is always a solution to a specific practical problem: how to 
enable many people, with diverse aims and situations, and with 
relatively little information, to coordinate their activity peacefully and 
productively with reference to the scarce and valued resources that 
they all need, but which they cannot all have. Assigning things to 
persons, via a limited number of standard rights, centrally the right to 
exclude others, is the paradigmatic way to make the world navigable 
for purposes of this sort of coordination.14 When we look at 
 
9. See Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism, supra note 4, at 1419 (explaining first option of 
exclusion theorists is to define property as oriented by just one principle).  
10. See id. at 1419–20 (setting out this alternative). 
11. See id. at 1416–21 (discussing exclusion theorists); see generally Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1849 (2007) (arguing moral 
intuitions that support property rights coincide with exclusion model); Henry E. Smith, Property 
as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691 (2012) (setting out and defending view of property 
centered on right to exclude rest of world from some specific thing). 
12. I have made my selective monist a woman so that the pronoun will neatly distinguish 
her from each of the other characters in this piece. 
13. Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism, supra note 4, at 1419. 
14. See Smith, supra note 11, at 1701–16 (reviewing use of modularity as flexible and 
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something—a car, a house, a stroller left on the corner beside a coffee 
shop—we know it belongs to someone, and we know roughly what 
“belongs” means.15 These legal and social facts are the standard 
blocks with which we can build castles and cities: Their simplicity 
and uniformity is what makes them the basis of highly complex 
responses to what I have just described as the basic practical problem 
of property.16 
So far so good. One may notice something about my selective monist. She 
has built a rather thin and general monistic account of property atop a view of 
the basic problem that property addresses—coordinating activity around scarce 
and valued resources. In this, she resembles one of the most sophisticated and 
persuasive living legal positivists, Scott Shapiro, who defines law generally as 
a solution to the problem of peacefully planning activity among people with 
conflicting aims and interests.17 I mention this connection because it 
illuminates what my selective monist is doing that is in contrast with Dagan’s 
project. She is declining, in Holmes’s phrase, to get any ethics into the law of 
property besides the overarching goal of solving perennial moral problems: 
how to resolve competing claims to scarce and valued resources and coordinate 
the different goals we have for them and ways we value them. Shapiro’s 
“planning” view of law rests on the idea that, once we understand law’s 
planning function, we will appreciate that it serves its goal precisely because, 
in the classic positivist formulation, its content does not depend on any 
particular relation to substantive morality.18 It is, instead, a form of 
coordination that enables us to avoid reference to that substantive level of 
moral commitment in navigating our shared lives.19 
My selective monist, then, is proceeding with reference to Dagan whereas 
Shapiro proceeds with reference to Ronald Dworkin, the defining proponent of 
an “interpretivist” view of law.20 Dworkin, like Dagan, understands bodies of 
law as organized by implicit ideas of the moral claims people have on one 
another, and, ultimately, the moral character of the political community that 
claims the authority to enforce its law coercively.21 My monist does not deny 
that areas of property law are susceptible to, even invite, this kind of moral 
interpretation. Rather, her interest in property law is at a level that is neutral to 
these interpretive ventures. 
 
simplifying architecture to enable various kinds of transactions). 
15. See id. at 1706 (explaining modular knowledge of exclusion as core to in rem rights). 
16. See id. at 1708 (describing potential for complex responses derived from simple set of 
rules). 
17. See Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 154–92 (2011) (analyzing law as technique of planning 
that responds to universal and perennial human need for peaceful coordination). 
18. Id. at 275. 
19. Id.  
20. See id. I am of course interpreting Shapiro’s project, but I note that he does not deny that 
the content of any area of law is shaped by moral decisions. Indeed, he embraces this point. His 
argument is that to identify the legal significance of this content we do not have to refer to the 
moral issues it resolves. Rather, we can understand its resolution of moral disputes as a set of 
social facts, created by sovereign decisions with the general aim of facilitating planning.  
21. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 176–216 (1986). 
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What, then, does she make of the fact that, as Dagan points out, there are 
many rooms in the mansion of property, and that, on her own interpretation, 
some of them recede into the background? Let her answer again: 
I don’t deny that those areas of law are parts of property, but my way 
of understanding the problem implies a spectrum, or pair of 
spectrums, marking different types of solutions to the basic problem 
of property. One spectrum runs from exclusion to governance, where 
governance means the community makes a shared decision about 
how the resource is to be used. The other spectrum runs from 
exclusion to sharing, where sharing involves multiple, overlapping 
claims on the resource. Each of these “opposites” of exclusion, 
where it occurs, will draw our attention to some feature of the 
situation that makes the paradigmatic solution unappealing. Maybe 
the resource is logistically difficult to administer by exclusion, 
because, for instance, it is a school of fish, and moves around in 
ways that are hard to monitor. Maybe it is dedicated to a value that 
deeply involves sharing, like a family home or a community center. 
But I say what is interesting about property is, in the words of Henry 
E. Smith, its “LEGO-like” solution22 to the problem of coordination, 
and I see departures from this as precisely that—departures, which 
show something illuminating about the boundaries of the core 
situation, but do not show anything about its character. 
Now, both my selective monist and Dagan have perfectly intelligible 
ways of thinking about property. They are simply looking at it from different 
points of view. But why would my selective monist, who is, after all, a 
pluralist, be looking at things this way in the first place? She might be 
convinced by H.L.A. Hart’s important concession, toward the end of The 
Concept of Law, that we select our definitions, and therefore our inquiries, for 
pragmatic and substantive reasons: We care what kinds of conversations we 
start when we define our topic in one way or another.23 She might, moreover, 
accept a goal that Hart believed his positivist definition of law served: to avert 
certain moral conflicts that can arise once one undertakes to discern the moral 
content of law.24 These conflicts can arise in either of two ways. On the one 
hand, once we have identified an area of law with a specific moral goal or 
commitment, we may make the mistake of assuming that whatever that moral 
idea implies must also be the content of law in this area—and, conversely, that 
when the law departs from this ideal, it loses legitimacy, or at least becomes 
suspect.25 On the other hand, we may make the opposite, symmetrical mistake 
of imagining that whatever the law establishes in this area shows us something 
about the content of the moral value we have aligned with it.26 The first 
mistake shows too little respect for law, and encourages ignoring it when it 
conflicts with moral judgments. The second gives law respect it has not earned 
 
22. Smith, supra note 11, at 1708. 
23. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 204–05 (1961). Hart, like my selective monist, 
chose a minimal and formal definition of his topic—in that case, law itself: the union of what he 
called primary and secondary rules of behavior, all of them determined in their content by social 
facts. See id. at 96. 
24. See id. at 205–07. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
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by assuming it is not just lawful, but morally right. Both get in the way of 
thinking clearly about law. They impede our appreciating that we must be free 
to criticize law morally, on the one hand, but, on the other, it has its own 
criteria of validity, which we may have good reason to respect even when it 
conflicts with our moral judgments. 
This is the classic reason to think of law separately from its internal moral 
commitments. It expresses itself in the positivism of Thomas Hobbes, who 
worried mainly that people would take contestable moral objections to law too 
seriously, and Jeremy Bentham, who had the opposite worry, that people 
would respect law too much, dulling the edge of criticism.27 Either argument 
distracts from law’s core function as provider of necessary solutions to a set of 
coordination problems—solutions, says my selective monist, such as 
property’s exclusion device. 
Do these antimoralizing considerations obtain in property law? Maybe. 
My selective monist might have been struck, for instance, by a recent exchange 
between the pluralist Gregory Alexander and one of Dagan’s monists, Henry 
Smith. Arguing that ownership implies social obligation, Alexander contended 
that the presence in some property doctrines of rules that depart from 
Blackstone’s “sole and despotic dominion”28 in favor of duties to others 
indicates something about the moral character of property law generally: that it 
contemplates owners’ owing something to the rest of society, in both refraining 
from using their own property harmfully and contributing affirmatively when 
called on to do so.29 Smith’s reply aimed mainly at defusing the moral 
interpretation of property doctrine.30 He argued that a doctrine’s means, such 
as protecting exclusion or lifting it in favor of some non-ownership interest, 
does not indicate its end, or purpose: Strict exclusion rules can serve social 
goals such as prosperity and opportunity, while injecting distributive and 
social-obligation considerations directly into the definition or adjudication of 
property rights can erode the functionality of property law’s core solution to 
the problem of coordination.31 
Suppose my pluralist would like to avoid inviting disputes such as this 
one. She agrees with Dagan that property law promotes various ends, some of 
them through the kinds of diverse doctrines that Dagan uses as his interpretive 
basis, but she also agrees with Smith that it is often counterproductive to try to 
reason normatively about property from the shape of specific doctrines. On the 
whole, she thinks a focus on the special “LEGO-like” functionality of the 
exclusion core keeps attention on property law’s distinctive achievement. 
 
27. See Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan 149 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651) (“[I]t is an 
easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of Libertie; and for want of Judgement 
to distinguish, mistake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the 
Publique only.”); see Shapiro, supra note 17, at 388–89 (describing Bentham’s positivism as 
demystifying doctrine). 
28.  2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2. 
29. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
Cornell L. Rev. 745, 769 (2009).  
30. See Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in 
American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 959, 971–74 (2009). 
31. See id. at 963–71. 
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Although a pluralist, she will often find it productive to approach property law 
as an interpretive monist, deliberately classifying the doctrines that Alexander 
and Dagan find most interesting as departures from property’s core. 
II. THE REFORMIST SELECTIVE MONIST 
Now to my second example: the reformist selective monist. In this 
example, my pluralist wakes up in a very different mood. Today she is 
animated, even agitated, by some reservations that she feels about the political 
limitations of Dagan’s pluralism. She doubts whether this pluralism has room 
for a productive relationship with a tradition of the left that is deeply skeptical 
of property. This tradition, like Dagan’s project, is oriented to autonomy, 
personhood, utility, labor, community, and distribution.32 The difference is that 
it sees property rights, not as integrating these values in diverse ways, but as 
standing in the way of our realizing them. The perception at the heart of this 
tradition is that property rights have marked a limit on a core aim of 
modernity: to provide for material needs while at the same time releasing the 
force of free human activity, including creativity and association with other 
persons.33 
Some scholars in the classical-liberal property school of thought identified 
private property, mostly in its exclusion-focused version, as bringing these 
aspirations into perfect mutuality: protecting freedom by the requirement of 
consent and promoting material welfare by directing free activity to 
economically productive ends.34 Dagan’s pluralism might be thought of as 
studying the patterns made by the shards of this classical-liberal synthesis: 
Allowing that property law, like the rest of legal order, involves tragic 
tradeoffs among values, what constellations do those values form in the 
various legal-institutional domains of life—commerce, housing, marriage, etc.? 
My pluralist’s question in this example is what Dagan’s liberal pluralism, 
which I suppose that she generally shares with him, can make of the argument 
that property’s relation to these values is not, as Facebook would have it, in a 
relationship, but “It’s complicated.” According to this argument, property and 
these liberal values might not be friends at all, or frenemies at best. 
Let me state in quick, polemical form, the lines of argument that my 
pluralist now wants Dagan to take seriously: 
(1) The distribution of wealth is a much deeper problem than we admit 
when we treat most of the present property system as presumptively legitimate: 
By ensuring leisure to a relatively small number and requiring the rest to work 
for survival, it systematically excludes many people from free, creative 
 
32. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 1 Politics, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social 
Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy 575–81 (2001) (explaining conception of 
empowerment that motivates his legal theory). 
33. See id. at 371 (describing “absolute” right of private property as basis of system of 
private power that limits human capacity for self-emancipation). 
34. See Purdy, The Meaning of Property, supra note 6, at 19–28 (reviewing competing 
conceptions of property’s purposes and Scottish Enlightenment ideal of their integration via 
liberal property). 
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activity, and even from the satisfaction of basic needs.35 
(2) The distribution of wealth, combined with the regime of market 
incentives that liberal property sets in motion, is relentlessly innovative, but in 
only a certain direction: that of more satisfaction of the wants of those who 
have, to the neglect of those who have not. Resources, but also creativity, 
collaboration, the whole suite of human powers, go more to sell stuff to the 
rich than to address the situation of the poor, or to foster creative activity or 
cooperation in ways not linked to profit.36 
(3) The commodifying tendency of a system that rewards what can be 
marketed means that, even though some of the surplus goes to social efforts, 
from the Gates Foundation to Kiva, the larger tendency is to put everything up 
for sale—from privatizing public institutions to selling things we might once 
have given away or shared or done out of duty or somehow managed in non-
market ways.37 
(4) Abstract financial property, exemplified by capital markets and 
derivatives, follows its own logic and becomes a kind of alien power—a 
jealous god that rewards its followers, punishes those who ignore its dictates, 
and periodically rains down storms on the obedient and impious alike.38 Until 
a few years ago, addressed to American legal scholars, this would have 
sounded like weird German metaphysics. Now, it just sounds like the housing 
crisis story, which has been told over and over since Michael Lewis hurried out 
The Big Short.39 
One approach to answering these challenges has been to find a productive 
irony in the activity of property law—that conventional innovation produces 
some very unconventional results, such as the sharing and dispersed production 
that Yochai Benkler explores, or the indispensable role of the public domain or 
commons, which James Boyle discusses.40 This is dialectics in a minor key: 
Private property produces, not its own abolition, but its constant adjustment, 
qualification, and partial displacement, often serving some arguably higher, or 
at least quirkier, value, which gives the lie (at least a little lie) to the claim that 
private property directs human energy in a monotonic way. 
 
35. See Robert L. Hale, Freedom Through Law: Public Control of Private Governing Power 
15–17 (1952) (setting out account of property rights as establishing baseline of regime of 
reciprocal, and generally unequal, coercive power). 
36. See Purdy, The Meaning of Property, supra note 6, at 115–16 (stating property regimes 
create markets by initial allocation, rather than simply following markets); Amartya Sen, The 
Moral Standing of the Market, in Ethics and Economics 1, 13 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 
1985) (same). 
37. See Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets 93–130 
(2012) (noting tendency of markets to overtake other forms of social organization).  
38. See Jedediah Purdy, Being America: Liberty, Commerce, and Violence in an American 
World 194–99 (2003) (making this argument, with reference to 1999–2000 Indonesian financial 
crisis).  
39. See Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (2010). 
40. See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom 35–58 (2006) (reviewing economics of dispersed production); id. at 133–
272 (discussing promotion of freedom through new technological forms that enable new property 
arrangements); James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind 17–41 
(2010) (noting importance of public domain to working regime of innovation). 
2013] SOME PLURALISM ABOUT PLURALISM 17 
It strikes my pluralist, in her radical mood, that Dagan takes a particularly 
sober version of this approach. His discussion of liberal commons 
arrangements, for example, speaks to it: We use the impersonal and chilly 
devices of the market to contract for community, commodifying what people 
were once born into. But, what we get, properly designed, can be genuinely a 
community—and one that, to boot, overcomes the parochialism and coercion 
of many traditional communities.41 The general idea here is that the closer one 
gets to the actual institutional workings of a legal regime, the more its 
multifariousness comes into view, and the less plausible it is to think of it in 
terms as blocky as Property = Capitalism = Commodification, etc., as if each 
of those words named just one thing, with one logic and meaning. Structural 
pluralism is an intellectual discipline directed against exactly this kind of rapid 
abstraction. My pluralist would see this as the Facebook position: Property and 
radical aspirations toward human emancipation are in a relationship, and “It’s 
complicated.” 
But still she hopes there can be another way for property law and 
scholarship to approach these radical challenges. A great deal of the 
conventional rationale for private ownership of resources is a set of collective 
action problems, the commons tragedy being the arch-paradigm, that serve as 
bleak meditations on human nature: lazy and destructive (though we learn to 
say instead, rational) when not motivated by greed or fear.42 Property, in the 
law school conversation, may have taken the crown that James Madison 
assigned to government: the greatest of all reflections on human nature.43 One 
question that motivates the Left critics—whom my pluralist is channeling 
today—is whether Property does not contribute to producing the “nature” its 
parables describe, helping to ensure that “realism” and modest pessimism 
about human motivation continue to be two terms for the same thing. 
Contrast property for a moment with another touchstone institution of 
liberal modernity: democracy. Democracy, too, arose in the light of pessimism 
such as Madison’s, but its growth has been informed by radical ideas of equal 
freedom and shared self-determination.44 The last 235 years, since the 
appearance in 1776 of both the Declaration of Independence and Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations, have seen in the institutions of political order a 
practical “reflection on human nature” that has proved people capable of much 
more freedom and equality than Madison’s generation thought possible.45 
So, concludes my pluralist, we liberal pluralists—she, Dagan, and the rest, 
including a character named Purdy—tend to be too quiescent about property’s 
lack of a utopian dimension. If democratic government is a reflection on 
human nature, it is one that, by its internal logic, produces constant pressure—
 
41. See Dagan, Property, supra note 3, at 229–44 (making this argument). 
42. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1327–28 (1993) 
(describing private property as solution to subset of collective action problems); Garret Hardin, 
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1243 (1968) (setting out canonical collective action 
problem rationale for property).  
43. See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison). 
44. See Jedediah Purdy, A Tolerable Anarchy: Rebels, Reactionaries, and the Making of 
American Freedom 154–60 (2009) (forwarding this argument, regarding democracy). 
45. See id. 
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practical and ideological—to test the limits of our ability to reconcile 
individual freedom, political equality, and collective self-determination. My 
pluralist’s complaint about liberal pluralism in property law is that it does not 
create this internal pressure to be asking, constantly, why we can’t all have our 
needs met and the opportunity to engage in free, productive activity. 
In other words, we ask about liberal democracy why it is not anarchy—in 
the good, utopian sense of order without coercion—and so we press toward 
draining unnecessary coercion out of it. But we don’t ask about liberal property 
why it is not communism—a strange question, maybe, certainly a deliberately 
provocative one, but one that might also help press toward draining avoidable 
inequality and coercion out of it. This would be, in an ironic way, no more than 
taking seriously the old claims of classical-liberal property theorists, that 
property should perfectly reconcile competing human goods, and ask whether 
we can’t use that asymptotically, not claiming to be able to reach it, but always 
measuring ourselves by how far we are from it. 
And how would my pluralist pursue this aim? By becoming a selective 
monist of the reformist kind, putting pressure on property law by insisting that 
it be always held to the standard of whether it is producing human freedom, in 
the double sense of freedom from coercion, on the one hand, and the 
enjoyment of a rich set of alternatives from which one may freely choose, on 
the other.46 Dagan points out in his Essay that structural pluralism can serve 
the ends of a value-monist who prizes freedom, because it supports a diversity 
of possible life-courses, and so promotes the second as well as the first 
dimension of freedom.47 My reformist selective monist, though, wants to go 
further, pressing on the property regime at every point where it might do more 
to realize its own utopian promise, of reconciling the satisfaction of our 
material needs with the liberation of our creative and collaborative activity. In 
her view, pluralism, for all its benefits, tends to small-c conservatism because 
it takes it cues from the internal structure of property institutions. These have 
at least two major limitations. First, operating within existing distributions of 
property, they tend to be blind to distributive considerations. Second, being 
constituted by well-established social practices, they tend toward familiar 
values and balances of value, not radical innovations. 
Now, my reformist selective monist might regard her radical approach 
merely as a kind of thought experiment, and even in this modest respect it 
could be productive. Even if she ultimately decides against the approach I have 
sketched, she might understand her reasons better by virtue of having 
genuinely pursued a kind of monism. She might conclude, pessimistically, that 
property is much more deeply constrained than democracy. While political 
liberty, from democratic suffrage to the constitutional protection of intimacy, 
describes an area where human freedom really has emerged in a dynamic way, 
she might conclude the tragic features of human nature to which Property 
responds, from scarcity to selfishness, are permanent and intractable, and we 
should not cross them. More pragmatically, she might judge that she doesn’t 
 
46. See Purdy, The Meaning of Property, supra note 6, at 111–13, 135–37 (arguing for this 
sort of integrated conception of freedom in property system). 
47. See Dagan, Property, supra note 3, at 1423–24. 
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know what I have just said to be true, but that, prudentially, we should act as if 
it were true, because the historical legacy of those who have assumed 
otherwise is too violent to tarry with these questions again. 
Or she might come to a middle ground. She might judge, not that we 
should avoid these questions wholesale, but that the answer to them will 
always be incremental, not categorical, and emerge from exactly the kinds of 
reformist and reconstructive explorations that property pluralism celebrates. 
But, she might conclude, returning fully to Dagan’s fold, there is nothing 
further gained by doing this under the sign of utopian reconciliation. Far better 
to do so under the more modest rubric of pluralist tradeoffs, where one is 
always trying to lessen the loss. 
Or she might decide to embrace the utopian imperative in property. She 
might genuinely become a selective monist, a pluralist who nonetheless 
believes that we serve our interests in property best if we always begin and end 
our inquiries by asking how far our property regime moves us toward the 
world that both the libertarian ancestors of the right and the utopian ancestors 
of the left sought. 
III. PLURALISM ABOUT PLURALISM 
My second example of selective monism wants to get, perhaps, even more 
ethics into property than Dagan does. My first agreed with those who see 
reasons to get ethics out. They both, though, give instances of the need for 
pluralism about pluralism. Pluralism is only one of the stances one might take 
toward property law, depending which issues one deems important and what 
one hopes to accomplish. There is a significant gap between pluralism as a 
general view and the working assumptions one brings to any particular 
problem. In the latter case, a selective monism may seem more clarifying or 
productive, precisely because it organizes the field, interpretively or in a spirit 
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